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Right of Way only over the Lands Apbpropiriated.
The charter of the Pennsylvania & Ohio Canal Company provided
that it might enter upon, take possession of, and use all such lands as
might be necessary for the construction of its works, commissioners
being authorized to assess damages, etc. The canal was further declared
to be a public highway, whereon anyone might travel on payment of'
tolls. The stock was declared real estate, and the works were vested in
fee in the stockholders as tenants in common. Held, that the company
acquired under the ierms of the charter a right of way only over the
lands appropriated by them, and that they did not acquire said lands
in fee.
As TO RIGHTS ACQUIRED IN AND TO LAND TAKEN BY THE EXERCISE
OF THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
The right acquired in land taken
by the exercise of the right of eminent domain may be an easement
or title in fee. Railway companies
generally acquire only the right of
way over and through the lands for
the purposes of their road.
It is well settled thatin the lands
of individuals, laid out for public
highways, in pursuance of our
statutes, the public and public
authorities acquire only an easement or right of way; a right to
employ it for the purposes of constructing, maintaining and, using
a public highway thereon. The
soil and freehold belong to the
o-ners of the land, subject only
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to this easement..
.......
Under our laws a railroad corporation possesses, under the lease from
the State, only an easement in the
land over which its road may have
been laid out and constructed,.
while the fee-the exclusive right
of property-in the land, and the
trees and herbage upon its surface,
and the minerals below it, subject
always to the easement of the railroad corporation, remain in the
original owner: Blake v. Rich, 34
N. H., 282.
The charter of the Western Vermont R. R. Co. provided that the
directors may cause such surveys.
of the road to be made as they-

RIGHTS IN LAND TAKEN
deemed necessary, and fix the line
of the game, .and that the company
might enter upon, aid take possession of, such lands as were necessary for the construction of their
road and requisite accommodations. Held, that under their
charter the company could not acquire any more land, or any greater
estate therein, for the purposes of
a road-bed or stations than was
really requisite for such uses; that
the estate so requisite was not one
in fee simple, but merely an easement; that when taken for such
purposes, the rule was the same,
whether the land was taken compulsorily by condemnation and the
award of commissioners as to its
extent and price, or under agreement of the parties as to one or
both of these particulars; that under their charter the directors had
power to lay, out their roads and
stations as they saw fit, and that so long as they acted in good faith,
and not recklessly, their decision,
as to.the quanity of land required
for depot accommodations, would
be regarded as conclusive: Hill v.
W. Vermont R. R., 32 Vt., 68.
A "right of way" in its legal and
generally accepted meaning in reference to a railroad, is a mere
easement in- the lands of others,
. otained by lawful condemnation
to public use, or by purchase: Williams v. W. Union R. R. Co., 5o
Wis., 7I. See also Heard v. City
of Brooklyn, 6o N. Y., 242; 20 Barb.
(N. Y.), 644; West Penna. IR. R.
Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa., 290; Phila.
W. & B. 11. R. Co. v. Williams, 54
Pa., 103.
The proprietor of the land retains
his exclusive right to all its mines,
quarries, springs of water, timber
and earth for every purpose not incompatible with the right of way.

This is the almost universal rule,
where a sovereign imposes a public right of way upon the land of an
individual.: Lion v. Gormley, 53
Pa., 261; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15
J6hns, 447; Sanderson v. Haverstick, 8 BArr, 294.
Where the- company have only
an easement, the former proprietor
of the soil still retains the fee of
the land and his right to the land
-for every purpose not incompatible
with the rights df the railroad company. Upon the discontinuance or
abandonment of the xight of way,
the entire and exclusive property
aid right of enjoyment revests in
the proprietor of .he soil. The
perpetual use Of the land vested in
the railway coinpany, its successors
and assigns for railroad purposes; the land owner had the right
to enter upon such land if he did
not interfere with the rights of the
railroad company: Kansas Central
Railway Co. v. Allen, 22 Kans.,
285.
. Under an act which authorizes
the City of Baltimore to purchase
or acquire property by condemnation, not for all purposis, but for
"the purpose of conveying water
into said city, for the use of said
city and for the health and convenience of the inhabitants thereof,"
Held, that the city might acquire
by condemnation of .the bed of a
stream, or water course, a right to
the use of the water in p~rpetuity,
but the use must be the one specified in the act, and there remains
in the owner the right to such use
of it as does not injuriously interfere with the city's use: Kane v.
Baltimore, 15. Md., 240.
The right of way contemplated
is that peculiar to a railroad, and
includes all that is necessary and
proper for the construction and
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maintainance of a railroad over the
premises. It is the right to freedom in locating, constructing and
conveniently using ahnd repairing
the road and its appurtenances;
and for such purpose only, of taking, removing and using materials
on or from the land so taken. It
contemplates the right to make
cuts and embankments: Henry v.
Dubuque & P. R. R. Co., 2 Ia.,
288.
The title to the timber standing
on land appropriated to a railroad
company, under the provisions of
the "Right of Way Act," remains
in the owner of the soil; and the
company have a right to take and
remove only so much thereof as
may be necessary for the construction and repair of the road and its
appurtenances: Preston v. Dubuque
& Pacific R. R. Co., ii Ia., 15.
A deed was made 'to the Morris
Canal and Banking Co., conveying
all the interest and estate of the
grantor in the lands and appurtenances to their only proper use,
benefit and beboof, "as long as
used for a canal." Held, that
while the estate continues, and until the qualification upon which it
is limited, is at an end, the grantee
has the same rights and privileges
over his estate as if it were a lee
simple: State v. Brown, 27 N. J.
L., 13.
The railroad company is entitled
to timber to the extent that it is
useful in the construction of the
line of the road. The fee in the
land is not acquired by the company, but a mere easement in such
land. The title remains in the
ou ner, the property being made
servient to the purposes of the railroad. But it must be borne in
mind that, in no condition of
things, can the railroad company
37

claim a right in the soil or trees,
except to use them for the special
purpose for which it was created;
and if, from any cause, such materials have been made unserviceable for such purpose, its right to
them is at an end: Taylor v. N. Y.
& L. B. R. R., 38 N. J. L., 28.
And the railroad company may
remove such material with a view
of constructing its road, but such
material cannot be sold to third
parties: Aldrich v. Drury, 8 R. I.,
554A railroad company may cut
trees in constructing a telegraph
line over and along its right of
way: W. Union Tel. Co. v. Rich.,
19 Kans., 517.
That the railway company must,
from the very nature of their
operations, in order to the security
of their passengers, workmen, and
the enjoyment of the road, have at
all times the right to the exclusive
occupancy of the land taken, and
to exclude all concurrent occupancy
by the former owners in any mode
and for any purpose. It is obvious
that the right of the railway to the
exclusive occupancy niust be for
all the purposes of the road, much
the same as that of an owner in
fee: Jackson v. Rut. & Bur. R. R.,
25 Vt., I5O.
One whose land has been taken
by a railroad company, under their
charter, for railroad purposes, has
no right to enter upon or use such
land for any purpose which, in the
least degree, endangers or embarrasses its use by the company
for any of the objects which the
railway is intended to accomplish:
The Con. & Pass. Rivers R. R. Co.
v. Holton, 32 Vt., 43.
Although the right of a railroad
company is but an easement, and
not a fee, this does not preclude
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their having sole and exclusive
possession of the land while in the
exercise of that easement
The
fact that, upon the abandonment
or surrender of their road and
charter, the land would revert to
the former owner, does not curtail
their right to its exclusive use if
necessary: Troy & Boston R. R.
Co. v. Potter, 42 Vt., 265.
Land of a private citizen was
-'taken for- the construction of the
* Erie Canal, and used for a number
of years, and afterward abandoned
by the State, and the canal located

.ina. different place. Hed, that
Such land when no longer necessary for public use reverted to the
original owner, although the Act
-under which it was taken declared
it should vest in the State iA fee
simple: People v. White i Barb.

(N. Y.), 26.
Although the act of incorporation
vests'in the company title to the
land over which the road passes,
on compliance by them with the
provisions of the act, such title
* must be considered as vested only
for the purposes of a road, and
when the road is abandoned the
land reverts to the original owners:
Hooker v. Utica Turnpike Road
Co., 12 Wend. (N. Y.), 371.
But it is within the power of the
State to authorize a change from
one public use to another of a like
kiffd:'Malone v. City of Toledo, 28

O.,643.
And the presumption is against a
fee: N. -0. Pacif. Railway Co. v.
Gay, 92 La. An., 471 ; City of Logansport v. Shirk, 88 Ind., 563.
In any case, however, an easement only would be taken unless
the statute plainly contemplated
and provided for the appropriation
of a larger interest: Cooley's Const.
Lim., 559.

In construing a statute authorizing the taking of private property
for public use, it will not be implied
that a greater interest or estate can
be taken than is absolutely necessary to satisfy the language and
object of the act. In the absence
of express words, a fee will not be
deemed to be taken where the purposes of the act will be satisfied by
the taking of an easement : Wash.
Cemetery v. Prospect Park Co., 16
N. Y., 591.
The charter of the Vermont Central Railroad Company provides
that the company, upon complying
with the condition upon which they
may take land for their road, shall
be "seized and possessed of the
land." This does not make themi
owners of fhe fee, but gives them
the right of way merely: Quimby
v. Vermont Centrl R. R. Co., 23
Vt.,'387.
• The legislature may, when it
deems it necessary, confer-a power
to take in fee simple: Prather v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 89 Ind., 501;
Water Works Co., v. Burkhart, 41
Ind., 364; Nelson v. Fleming, 56
Ind., 3io; Dinley v.' Boston, ioo
Mass., 544; Cotton v. Miss. & R.
R. Boom Co., 22 Minu. 372; New
York & H. R. R., 46 N. Y., 546;
Troy & B. R. R. v. Potter, 42 Vt.,
265.
A fee may be taken although the
public use for which tle land may
be taken is special and nqt of necessity permanent or perpetual. Where
a statute authorizes the taking of a
fee it cannot be held invalid, or that
an easement only was acquired
thereunder, on the ground that an
easement only was required to accomplish the purpose in view:
Sweet v. The Buffalo, N. Y. & Phila.
R. W. Co., 79 N. Y., 293:
Whenever the Commonwealth

